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Good evening everyone, and thank you for coming along tonight to share with me what is, in 
many respects, one of the most important events in my career at this University. To be honest, 
when I first started working here almost twenty years ago, I never imagined that I would ever 
stand here in this context, and as I do before you tonight; on the contrary, I was only supposed to 
be back in South Africa, and at the then-University of Port Elizabeth, for one year to do a quick 
postgraduate qualification in journalism, because that was the career I thought I would like to 
pursue. However, one of the first courses that I had to register for was a philosophy module 
taught by Prof. Bert Olivier – who in his capacity to evocatively introduce students to new 
thinkers, remains a veritable force of nature – and accordingly that was about as far as my 
journalism aspirations got, because I rediscovered there the same thing that had so powerfully 
animated my undergraduate studies.  
 
To be clear, this was not philosophy as a discipline, which like all canonical edifices can come 
across as weighty, dusty and extremely boring; especially when it rather arrogantly assumes the 
position of arbiter of truth, and tries to determine what everybody else can or cannot think, or 
what they should or should not say. Rather, what I encountered again in that Honors-level 
philosophy module was something that I had glimpsed during my undergraduate studies, but 
which I had yet to fully appreciate, namely an approach to thinking that was also an approach to 
life, on the part of certain people who, in their time, had to a large extent philosophized privately 
as they carried out their many other duties, or philosophized outside of the academy, or remained 
on the margins of academic philosophy – men like Marcus Aurelius, Friedrich Nietzsche, and 
Benedictus Spinoza. And in following the University’s standard brief for an inaugural address, I 
feel it would be thoroughly remiss of me not to mention the three profound lessons that these 
three authors respectively taught me. This is not only because I owe each of them an immense 
debt which I will obviously never be able to repay, but also because in reflecting on my current 
work – as I have been asked to do this evening – I realize just how immensely important all three 
of them continue to be both in my ongoing research activities, and indeed in my personal life.  
 
Firstly, Aurelius’s poignant observations on the perennial madness of existence (2006: II. 1; 
VIII. 1), taught me not to expect constant sanity either from myself or from those around me, 
because of the powerful contrary forces animating us all, which we all tend to remain blind too 
until it is too late. Secondly, Nietzsche’s all-too-incisive remarks on issues that for most people 
are too deep for words (2004; 2006), taught me not to be cowed by the intimidating phenomenon 
of hallowed silence, the aura of which – in its overarching demand for veneration – can all too 
often stop critical thought in its tracks. And thirdly, Spinoza’s ironic laughter in the face of 
weighty conceptions of being (2007), taught me perhaps the most important lesson, namely that 
of the salvific power of humor, which can so easily shatter the heaviness of life just before it 
succeeds in crushing us. Three lessons, so simple, but so life-changing: accept the madness of 
life, but don’t ever revere it, and when others do don’t forget to laugh – because there’s a great 
emancipatory power in that which derives from laughter’s resonance with the ‘unbearable 
lightness’ of being itself (Kundera 1980; Kundera 1984).   
 
The first lesson in particular continues to serve me very well in the field of Cultural Studies, 
which is one of my two disciplines, and where I have accordingly been partially situated for the 
past two decades, because madness in many ways is the medium of Cultural Studies. That is, the 
madness of the modern city, in which people – alienated from their traditional life and the 
grounding beliefs and mores that this previously offered them – find themselves adrift in an 
ocean of competing discourses and simulacra, which moreover tend to pull them in thoroughly 
incongruous directions, while they, by way of response, constantly conjure up for themselves 
new fictions about who or what they are. Each time believing that the role they cast themselves 
in will last, and desperately seeking out others who are willing to play along by agreeing with 
them in this regard. Of course, they also tend to get deeply annoyed with those around them who 
refuse to indulge them in this way, or those who – even worse – conjure up for themselves 
antithetical roles that run counter to the hastily-constructed and half-hearted cosmology of the 
would-be actor in question. So if this is the culture of the modern city, then madness really is the 
medium of Cultural Studies, which takes as its object of focus metropolitan-scale insane 
asylums, as it were, where there have never been any directors, only the occasional inmate who 
has temporarily assumed such a role. And what is true of Cultural Studies is even more true of 
Film Studies, my second discipline, which takes as its object of focus the collective dreams of 
complete lunatics writ large on silver screens, before which all the other inmates sit mesmerized; 
laughing and clapping and crying and being afraid, before they trundle off to bed to lose 
themselves in miasmic dreams of their own. Dreams that tomorrow will inspire them to create 
brand new roles for themselves, which they’ll act out in the dim morning light, on some 
imaginary stage in an empty auditorium in their mind, to the rousing applause of a nonexistent 
audience, before they smile to themselves and think, “How good life is…” Considered in this 
way, if you are involved in Cultural Studies and/or Film Studies and you do not accept the 
madness of modern city life, you’ll likely end up going quite insane. But if you do accept the 
madness of such existence and you do make your peace with it, then it becomes possible to see 
in even the most bizarre, sad, random, pathetic, and/or terrifying cultural gesture or film, the 
drama of contemporary existence playing out poignantly, through the respective desires for 
recognition, for love, for meaning, for power, and for sacrifice.  
 
The latter point on sacrifice is particularly significant for me because in many ways my research 
in Cultural Studies continues to be linked with Religious Studies, which should not be confused 
in any way with Theology or confessionalism of any sort. Rather, I understand Religious Studies 
to be couched in the idea that we are far less homo sapiens, or wise beings, as Carolus Linnaeus 
would have us believe (Ereshefsky 2004: 200), and far more homo religiosus, or beings who 
believe, interminably and irremediably, as Mircea Eliade suggested us to be (1987: 202). I must, 
however, qualify that statement by explaining that I nevertheless have many problems with the 
way in which Eliade extrapolates upon this issue, to draw connections in support of a notion of 
religiosity as definitive of some human essence; on that account we part company. But this is 
because I instead understand such tenacious belief as a form of madness that can manifest just as 
easily in the construction of religions, as it can in the creation of secular discourses and cultural 
practices, which are then reified to a level equivalent to the sacred by the people involved, 
insofar as they believe that through them they will attain some semblance of lasting peace and 
fulfillment. And what continues to interest me about the madness of such belief, at a cultural 
level, is both its centralized augmentation in the modern period – from the eighteenth century 
onwards – in the belief that industrial productivity, science, and progress are the way, the truth 
and the light, respectively, and the cultural dispersion this subsequently precipitated among more 
marginal figures, who in response established for themselves contrary beliefs that happiness lies 
elsewhere; for example, in traditional rather than modern practices, and in other parts of the 
world where the development agenda has not yet taken hold as a guiding vision, or where its 
tenets have been resisted. The corollary of all this, though, is that the madness of such belief is 
today ubiquitous, such that we must accept it, if only because all of us are in some or other way 
under its influence for large parts of our lives – save only for those moments when we are at our 
most jaded.  
 
Yet it is one thing to accept such madness, but another thing entirely to revere such madness, or 
the products of such madness, and it is for this reason that I continue to feel such a resonance 
with Michel Foucault’s work, because I always encounter in his writing a singular capacity to 
underscore the second life lesson I learned from Nietzsche. That is, not to revere the madness 
around one – even if one does accept it – but rather to engage critically with a belief whenever it 
becomes subject to growing veneration, because of the very real danger of such reverence 
rapidly congealing into dogma that can stop critical thought in its tracks. Indeed, for me, 
Foucault takes things further than Nietzsche in this regard, by drawing attention to those many 
contemporary concepts and institutions – which Nietzsche could only have guessed at – that have 
become so imbued with the aura of credibility that we tend today to consider them as given, even 
natural, features of our life-worlds. Features which we then often fail to see for what they are, 
namely constructs arbitrarily cobbled together in piecemeal fashion by discursive artisans who, 
in most cases, never consulted each other either on the paradigm they were thereby giving birth 
to, or on what its features might entail for the beings who would thereafter find themselves 
caught up in, and defined by, such terms and categories.  
 
I am speaking, for example, of the concept of the ‘human’ – which still receives so much 
unselfconscious thematization today as though it were something natural, with scant regard for 
its status as an inadvertent product of certain historico-discursive dynamics. There have, of 
course, been several fascinating theorizations regarding the origins of this concept, and how it 
became so imbued with credibility that we now construe it as a nonnegotiable feature of our 
discursive landscape (Bloom 1999; Stuurman 2017); one around which we build all manner of 
ethical frameworks, moral imperatives and legal injunctions. But of these critical engagements 
with the concept, Foucault’s archaeological approach in The Order of Things, in which he 
identifies the human as the unintended consequence of relatively unrelated shifts in the 
eighteenth-century discourses of life, labor and language, remains for me so evocative. This is 
because his irreverence for this otherwise hallowed belief goes so far as to imply the possibility, 
and indeed the importance, of desubjectification – which I have referred to in the title of this 
evening’s lecture – and which amounts to pursuing relative freedom from the burden of this 
concept. In short, on the one hand, the changes Foucault highlights took place in the eighteen-
century discourses of life, labor and language, when they all increasingly re-orientated 
themselves around notions of ‘depth’ and ‘enigma;’ but because human beings live, work and 
speak, they too, around this time inadvertently became imbued with the same collective aura of 
‘profundity’ and ‘enigmatic density’ (Árnason 2018: 21-22). And this has haunted us ever since, 
because of the accompanying obligation for us to account for who and what we really are, deep 
down – as though such a thing were ever possible.1 Yet, on the other hand, the corollary of 
Foucault’s analysis, as he so beautifully writes in the last lines of The Order of Things, is that if 
these three discursive “arrangements were to disappear…then one can certainly wager that man” 
– or the concept of the human being – “would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of 
the sea” (2003: 422).  
 
This last line holds immense significance for me, because it so powerfully links to the trajectory 
of thought that eventually became my book, Buddhism and Transgression: The Appropriation of 
Buddhism in the Contemporary West (2009), and that continues to inform my theoretical 
engagement with Buddhism, which I still conduct mostly through the lens of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis. This is because, in all of this research, the issue at heart remains for me 
critical processes of desubjectification – or the tracing of the means by which certain types of 
subjectivity have become instantiated and normativized. A process of critical enquiry that is 
necessarily indissociable from an erosion of the particular subjectivity in question, because to 
hold out at arm’s length, as it were, and to problematize (Foucault 1984: 117-119), the very 
discursive mechanisms that gave birth to you as a concept, as an identity, is also to watch those 
mechanisms begin to unravel and fall away. And why this is so important to me, is because it 
dovetails with my own enduring interest in Buddhist philosophy, which is similarly predicated 
on the possibility of radical desubjectification to the point of ultimate emptiness, as alluded to 
through the Buddhist terms of ‘enlightenment’ and ‘nirvana,’ etcetera.  
 
In this regard, though, what I tried to show in my book was that, while due recognition must still 
be given to the Buddhist moral considerations that greed, anger and delusion lie at the heart of 
the six senses – sight, sound, smell, touch, taste, and mind – where they collectively precipitate 
the ego, which we all cling to and feed as time goes on, in the modern era this is no longer the 
only basis for suffering. On the contrary, a great deal of suffering has since the nineteenth 
century sprung from the thorough disconnect between the various aspects of what Foucault calls 
disciplinary and bio-power; a disconnect which has received relatively little thematization, but 
which has nevertheless contributed to the constitution of contemporary subjectivity as something 
rather twisted. For example, on the one hand, the panoptically-enforced disciplinary 
regimentation of space and time (Foucault 1991: 141-156, 200-202), demands heightened 
autonomy on the part of the subject, and reacts punitively to deficits in this regard, and this sees 
us all racing to work on time, and clocking in, and working under the watchful gaze – actual or 
virtual – of some or other form of surveillance. But on the other hand, psychiatric discourses, 
which emerged under the auspices of what Foucault calls the deployment of sexuality (1998: 65-
67), at the same time advance the impossibility of anyone ever being thoroughly autonomous in 
perpetuity, on account of the latent or unconscious forces which are supposed to underpin all our 
thoughts, words, and actions, and which we are ostensibly powerless to understand without the 
guidance of some therapist – who also just happens to charge by the hour.  
 
So in my book, I considered the autobiographies of three Western Buddhists, who are also 
important Western Buddhist authors, with the understanding that such autobiographies are 
                                                 
1
 Foucault alludes to this burden, and the corresponding yearning to be free from it, in the now-famous phrase from 
the Archaeology of Knowledge in which he asserts: “Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: 
leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we 
write” (2002: 19).  
inextricably intertwined with the disciplinary technology of the dossier, through which 
individuality is documented as “a ‘case,’” which then functions simultaneously as “an object for 
a branch of knowledge and a hold for a branch of power” (Foucault 1991: 191). But what 
fascinated me was not only how all three authors in question used the autobiography format as a 
mechanism of resistance – to oppose their respective disciplinary identities by advancing new 
identities of their own making. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, what intrigued me 
was how they all, in various ways and to different degrees, articulated their mystical experiences 
in the Far East in terms of, firstly, open time and space, or the absence of rigid disciplinary 
spatio-temporal regimentation; secondly, panoptical empowerment, insofar as they became the 
watchers rather than the watched; and thirdly, silence, or the absence of imperatives to confess. 
And for me, what this intimated was that the suffering which all three authors experienced, and 
which precipitated their embrace of Buddhism, had precious little to do with the endless rounds 
of death and rebirth, which Buddhists have traditionally sought to escape from through pursuing 
enlightenment. Rather, these three authors’ suffering had almost everything to do with both the 
disciplinary/bio-power discursive matrix within which they were born and grew up, and which 
they experienced as oppressive, and the discursive incongruities of this matrix that I alluded to a 
moment ago, from which they so much desired to escape that they were prepared to literally 
journey to the other end of the earth to do so.  
 
In particular, these considerations continue to feature prominently in my ongoing work on 
Buddhism, in which I ask admittedly difficult but nevertheless important questions about the 
extent to which Western Buddhism is a response to modern forms of discursively-induced 
suffering; about how such status renders it significantly different to more traditional forms of 
Buddhism – which emerged much earlier in thoroughly different contexts and as responses to 
very different problems; and about the need to begin recognizing such differences in order to 
move away from what I have termed ornamental forms of Buddhism in the West, toward 
eminently political forms. In this regard, my work resonates to some extent with the politicized 
forms of Engaged Buddhism that emerged in South East Asia around the time of the Vietnam 
War (Nhat Hanh 1999). But it also differs from them in that, where they today largely target 
global capitalism and the consumer subjectivity it is inculcating to disastrous socio-
environmental effects (Sivaraksa 2005; Loy 2008; Kaza 2005; Stanley, Loy and Dorje 2009), I 
take as my object of focus the discourses of disciplinary/bio-power and the type of tortured 
subjectivity inadvertently produced through them (Konik 2012). Correlatively, I have also 
become very interested in how, in certain historical instances, Buddhism has not only served the 
ends of state power, but has also been rearticulated so that it becomes a means of either 
exercising power against the state, or countering certain discourses that inform overarching state 
or cultural practices (Konik 2016). Of course, to consider things in this light is to treat with 
unavoidable irreverence not only the avowed beliefs of certain Buddhist practitioners, but also 
the very uncritical way in which Buddhism has been construed in the West through an Orientalist 
lens – from the perspective of which it is believed to be an entirely spiritual panacea, utterly 
detached from the world of politics and cultural struggles, and single-mindedly orientated instead 
around the pursuit of enlightenment. But it is arguably important to persevere in this regard, 
because to allow such beliefs to congeal into dogma, is to do a great disservice to the myriad 
cultural forms that find expression in the many variants of Buddhism, all of which – much like 
Edward Said’s ‘Orient’ – comprise not an extant, static reality, but rather an ongoing series of 
works in progress, on the part of different communities of interpretation (Said 1997: 44-45; Said 
2003: 870-871), as they move through, and pass in and out of, time. 
 
However, while the subtitle of this evening’s lecture is “From Foucault to Deleuze and beyond,” 
by this I did not wish to imply that I have somehow ‘moved on’ from Foucault. Rather, what I 
meant by this was that, after several years of more or less exclusive focus on Foucault’s work, I 
began in 2010 to read Deleuze, and have since then found myself being drawn ever more into his 
ambit of influence. Yet, this has by no means entailed my abandonment of any recourse to 
Foucault’s work; on the contrary, as I have already indicated, my work on Buddhism continues 
to be informed by Foucault’s conception of power and knowledge. And beyond this my partner, 
Dr. Inge Konik, and I are currently completing an article for the journal Angelaki, in which we 
render a critique – again through the lens of Foucauldian archaeological and genealogical 
analyses – of certain types of eco-subjectivity. But there are a number of reasons for my shift 
towards Deleuze, including Foucault’s own contention that the edifice of disciplinary/bio-power 
society had already begun to break down after the Second World War (cited in Deleuze 1990: 3), 
such that, while so many of its vestiges remain with us today, there are also other powerful 
forces now at play, from the juggernaut of neoliberalism to the digital technology that is such an 
increasingly pervasive, and indeed invasive, part of our lives (Deleuze 1990: 4-6). And these 
forces were not things that Foucault dealt with exhaustively, or in the case of digitality, at all. 
Correlatively, at a certain point I also began to doubt the continued validity of Foucault’s 
conception of the modern world. This is because the idea of it as a domain of over-arching 
spatio-temporal regimentation and ubiquitous surveillance, in which resistance to homogeneity – 
while so important – can also at times be both difficult to imagine and even more difficult to 
achieve, no longer rang as true for me as it once did. And this was not least because of Deleuze’s 
(and Guattari’s) concept of ‘leakage’ (2005: 204), which speaks instead of a world in which all 
manner of top-down efforts to corral and canalize desires, interests or behaviors, tend sooner or 
later to fail,
2
 not least because they entail trying to herd beings who can only ever recall things 
creatively rather than verbatim, even when they want to do exactly as they have been told to do. 
Indeed, on account of this wonderfully fresh perspective, Deleuze became increasingly important 
in my research, and I must acknowledge that it was through him that I became reacquainted not 
only with Spinoza, but also with the third life lesson that Spinoza taught me so long ago, 
concerning the salvific power of ironic laughter in the face of weighty conceptions of being. As 
Deleuze points out with such diabolical humor in his “Letter to a Harsh Critic” in the book 
Negotiations, immense difficulty is faced by anyone who sets out, with all the seriousness and 
honorable intentions in the world, to advance a particular way of thinking or speaking or acting, 
because no sooner is their book or article published, than a process of reading them against 
themselves begins (1973: 6). Indeed, in terms of this, they are likely to be thoroughly 
misunderstood by their readers, who then proceed to compound the confusion not only by 
misquoting and miscommunicating their ideas, but also by building such misrepresentations into 
new conceptual assemblages, which are in turn misappropriated and misused by others – even as 
all of them try to be faithful to the primary author. One can only imagine the horror of the 
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 In “Foucault and the Prison,” Deleuze explains that after the publication of Foucault’s The Will to Knowledge: The 
History of Sexuality, Volume 1, he “realized…that [they] did not share the same view of society,” before advancing 
that: “For me a society is something that never stops slipping away…Society is something that leaks, financially, 
ideologically – there are points of leakage everywhere. Indeed, the problem for society is how to stop itself from 
leaking…[F]or me society is a fluid…or even worse, a gas. For Michel [Foucault] it was an architecture” (1986: 21). 
primary author who, one unfortunate day, happens upon the contorted and mutated vestiges of 
their original ideas demonically imbricated with a multiplicity of conceptual fragments and 
doctrinal debris they would never have imagined possible, even in their worst nightmares. But 
this is the phenomenon of leakage, and it is effectively the key to escaping from the prison house 
of Foucault’s conception of the modern world.  
 
The reason for much of this is the dynamic of memory identified by Bergson (1962: 210-212) – 
which continues to play such a large part in my current work – and a moment’s attention is 
enough to clarify the associated cryptic phrase that “the present…does not cease to pass” while 
“the past…does not cease to be…present” (Deleuze 1991: 59). In short, as the present seconds of 
this lecture pass, the past – in which I introduced myself and provided the context for this 
evening’s discussion – remains present, and this allows you to make sense of my words. But 
each time you recall that past, memory inflects it differently, adding some features here and 
eclipsing others there, or emphasizing certain points while displacing other aspects. And this is 
the creative nature of memory, whose playful processes are both interminable and in keeping 
with the durational movement of life itself in the universe (Bergson 1960: 10-11; Bergson 1965: 
44-45). Accordingly, this leaves us with no choice but to repeat things differently, each time, so 
that difference becomes deeper and broader with each attempt at repetition, until we can scarcely 
even recognize in our repetitions the original thing we are trying in vain to emulate (Deleuze 
2001: 1-4). The reality of this is so beautifully evinced in the disintegration over centuries, or 
even decades, of religions, of cultures, and of traditions, by the very hands of those who try so 
hard to keep them together through their acts of deep reverence. A reverence to which we must 
respond with the salvific power of humor, to shatter the heaviness of such life before it can crush 
us. 
 
What I continue to argue in my work is that Deleuze’s cinematic movement-images (2005a) and 
time-images (2005b) most powerfully reflect upon the vicissitudes of duration and memory that 
render all such acts of reverence poignantly empty gestures; and that to laugh at such gestures is 
not to be cruel, but rather by definition a matter of survival, such that it amounts to serious 
laughter, which is also seriously necessary laughter, if the possibility for difference is to remain 
open. In this regard, since 2010, I have been endeavoring to write film theory on movement- and 
time-images, through which I seek to render conspicuous the political implications of 
thematizing such reflections on time and memory in cinema. For me, these implications are 
immense, and most palpably felt in conservative worlds orientated around establishing some or 
other new order, based on retrospectively-constructed symbols and hagiographic history, in 
terms of which, ironically, “the present [i]s seen to be a continuation of a past, that [i]s itself a 
construction of the present” (Martin-Jones 2006: 33).3 
 
In the face of such madness, and reverence for madness, the time-image responds by shattering 
the heaviness of such life through recalling, with growing irony, how all such memorializing 
                                                 
3
 For example, conservative worlds where people effectively decide in the present who the past founders or martyrs 
of the tradition or movement were, before they instantiate them as such, with much ceremony and symbolism, and 
then seek to defend one corresponding ‘official’ version of history. A version which is moreover recalled with a 
manufactured reverence so emotive, that the indictment of anyone who does not concur becomes automatic, and the 
potential justification for all manner of reprisals and atrocities – with the Easter bombings on 21 April 2019 in Sri 
Lanka, and the earlier Christchurch massacre in New Zealand on 15 March 2019, being tragic cases in point. 
recollects pasts that have never actually been present – or never been quite as they are recollected 
in the present – and that the very endeavor to establish and cling to history in this way is akin to 
clutching a handful of sand so tightly that all the grains escape between your fingers. In this 
sense, the time-image can also be curatively catalytic, when it succeeds in opening the fingers of 
such a hand before it can form a fist; a possibility which renders time-images potentially very 
socio-culturally transformative, when they counter the construction of conceptual walls that 
threaten to destroy friendships, or make them impossible.  
 
Accordingly, such cinema remains politically valuable in an ordinary sense today, given the rise 
of neo-fascisms around the world and the associated myopic identity politics, which time-images 
can help to counter. But in addition, what I try to show in my work is that time-images are also 
political in an extra-ordinary sense, in relation to the increasingly dogmatic neoliberal 
worldview, predicated on the founding fathers of Hayek and Friedman, the symbol of the dollar, 
and the single ‘official’ version of history in which laissez-faire capitalism has emerged as the 
only viable economic game in town, and in terms of which environmental degradation is 
considered an unfortunate but unavoidable form of collateral damage. And time-images which 
respond, laughingly, to the revered madness of all of this, continue to hold a particular 
fascination for me, not only because of their erosion of the digital capitalist subject position, but 
also because of their correlative opening up of a universal vision – tantamount to what Spinoza 
calls the mystical experience of beatitude – in which the limits of the human organism are 
exceeded, and the univocity of being is evoked.  
 
To be sure, theorizing how exactly this is achieved in films such as Perrin and Cluzaud’s Oceans 
(Konik and Konik 2016) and Les Saisons (Konik 2017), and Nuridsany and Pérennou’s 
Microcosmos (Konik, under review), is in each case an unavoidably formalistic exercise. But for 
me, such formalism remains both something beautiful in itself, and something crucial for those 
who teach film theory, or who are involved in film-making, because only through such 
laboriously methodical analyses are we able to arrive at tentative understandings of how the 
mechanism of the time-image works – as part of a human-technological machinery, the nexus of 
which is the screen and the memory that recalls the images reflected upon it. And this 
understanding is so important to achieve, because it equips us with the means of pushing time-
images ever further, in the direction of ever greater desubjectification, and correspondingly, in 
the pursuit of ever more intense experiences of cinematic beatitude. Accordingly, this has 
entailed me focusing less and less on the films and directors Deleuze thematized, in favor of new 
types of environmental cinema – a genre which he in many ways glossed over, perhaps because 
the extent of the environmental crisis was not appreciated back then to the degree that it is now.  
 
But this move ‘beyond’ Deleuze, as it were, is only fitting, because digital environmental cinema 
presents an aporia which falls to us to deal with as best we can. In short, at the very moment we 
are able through digital means to draw closer to the natural environment than ever before – 
through the light-weight mobility and low-light filming capacity of digital cameras – the 
infrastructural and economic system of which such digitality is part is destroying more of the 
natural environment than ever before. I have no doubt that Deleuze would have chuckled at 
length over the irony of this, but part of his laughter would likely have derived from how his 
involvement with nature – through his concept of ‘becoming-animal’ – seems to have extended 
little further than the literary insect of Kafka’s Metamorphosis (Deleuze and Guattari 2003: 5-6, 
13-15), or the all-too-human white whale of Melville’s Moby Dick (Deleuze and Guattari 2005: 
243-249). To be blunt, I question whether Deleuze’s concept of ‘becoming-animal’ provides us 
with the sort of ethical approach to the environment which is so sorely needed at present, or 
whether it was always more about freeing us from the constraining conception of human 
separateness from the univocity of being. But to the extent that the breakdown of such 
conceptions of separateness can lead toward more sympathetic and sustainable relations between 
humans and the non-human world, Deleuze may well have a place in our future, although we 
will have to acknowledge that he will be a Deleuze of our own making.  
 
In this ongoing and onerous task of reading Deleuze against himself, though, I consider myself 
extremely fortunate to have the support of my partner, Inge, whose work on environmentalism in 
general and ecofeminism in particular, so often overlaps with my own concerns and interests. 
This has allowed us to collaborate very meaningfully, and indeed productively, in the publication 
of five accredited articles to date, both nationally and internationally, with a current sixth article 
under way in which we are exploring what ecofeminist time-images might entail. Of course, such 
acknowledgment does not do justice to all the further support which Inge, as my poor long-
suffering partner, has provided to me – from constant companionship and conversation to robust 
critical debate – all of which I remain eternally grateful for.  
 
Thanks must also go to my colleagues, both past and present, who have accompanied me on this 
journey: To the late Director of the School of Language, Media and Culture, Prof. Danie 
Jordaan, who so long ago gave me a chance to prove myself; to Prof. Peter Cunningham, for 
always offering key strategic advice when it was most needed; and to Prof. Bert Olivier, whom I 
have already acknowledged, but who I believe deserves a second mention for consistently setting 
the philosophical bar so high. I would also like to thank the current Dean of the Faculty of Arts, 
Prof. Rose Boswell, for her ongoing support, and Prof. Marius Crous, the Director of the School 
of Language, Media and Communication, for keeping the academic project so alive in what are 
often very trying times. Also, huge thanks must go to Dr. Subeshini Moodley, our Head of 
Department, both for running our department so wisely, and more recently, for perhaps unwisely, 
agreeing to collaborate with me on the making of an international documentary film – the 
funding outcome of which we are keenly awaiting. Of course, so many other people have also 
contributed to me being here tonight, but if I were to try to mention you all by name, we would 
be here all night, and I have already taken up enough of your time. But I know that you know 
who you are, and I trust that you realize just how important all of you continue to be in my life.  
 
In closing, if you have noticed an element of belief creeping cautiously but steadily into what I 
have been saying, you are absolutely correct; but you must please grant me this plenary 
indulgence – for which I have paid very dearly – if only because I am no more or less mad than 
the rest of you, in my belief that what is good, and beautiful, and wise, will somehow prevail 
over the totalizing forces of our time. In sum, then, and like the dear demure character of Red 
Peter from Franz Kafka’s most poignant short story A Report to An Academy, I hope that I have 
sufficiently presented to you, the Academy, the details of my intellectual transformation into a 
professor, all the while ready to apologize for any vestiges of my former life which I have not 
been able to extinguish – notwithstanding the irony that my whole duration in its absolute 
entirety has led to this moment. I thank you all for your time. 
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